openclaw 2026.2.14

Changes

• Telegram: add poll sending via openclaw message poll (duration seconds, silent delivery, anonymity controls). (#16209) Thanks @robbyczgw-cla.
• Slack/Discord: add dmPolicy + allowFrom config aliases for DM access control; legacy dm.policy + dm.allowFrom keys remain supported and openclaw doctor --fix can migrate them.
• Discord: allow exec approval prompts to target channels or both DM+channel via channels.discord.execApprovals.target. (#16051) Thanks @leonnardo.
• Sandbox: add sandbox.browser.binds to configure browser-container bind mounts separately from exec containers. (#16230) Thanks @seheepeak.
• Discord: add debug logging for message routing decisions to improve --debug tracing. (#16202) Thanks @jayleekr.

Fixes

• CLI/Plugins: ensure openclaw message send exits after successful delivery across plugin-backed channels so one-shot sends do not hang. (#16491) Thanks @yinghaosang.
• CLI/Plugins: run registered plugin gateway_stop hooks before openclaw message exits (success and failure paths), so plugin-backed channels can clean up one-shot CLI resources. (#16580) Thanks @gumadeiras.
• WhatsApp: honor per-account dmPolicy overrides (account-level settings now take precedence over channel defaults for inbound DMs). (#10082) Thanks @mcaxtr.
• Telegram: when channels.telegram.commands.native is false, exclude plugin commands from setMyCommands menu registration while keeping plugin slash handlers callable. (#15132) Thanks @Glucksberg.
• LINE: return 200 OK for Developers Console "Verify" requests ({"events":[]}) without X-Line-Signature, while still requiring signatures for real deliveries. (#16582) Thanks @arosstale.
• Cron: deliver text-only output directly when delivery.to is set so cron recipients get full output instead of summaries. (#16360) Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
• Cron/Slack: preserve agent identity (name and icon) when cron jobs deliver outbound messages. (#16242) Thanks @robbyczgw-cla.
• Media: accept MEDIA:-prefixed paths (lenient whitespace) when loading outbound media to prevent ENOENT for tool-returned local media paths. (#13107) Thanks @mcaxtr.
• Agents: deliver tool result media (screenshots, images, audio) to channels regardless of verbose level. (#11735) Thanks @strelov1.
• Agents/Image tool: allow workspace-local image paths by including the active workspace directory in local media allowlists, and trust sandbox-validated paths in image loaders to prevent false "not under an allowed directory" rejections. (#15541)
• Agents/Image tool: propagate the effective workspace root into tool wiring so workspace-local image paths are accepted by default when running without an explicit workspaceDir. (#16722)
• BlueBubbles: include sender identity in group chat envelopes and pass clean message text to the agent prompt, aligning with iMessage/Signal formatting. (#16210) Thanks @zerone0x.
• CLI: fix lazy core command registration so top-level maintenance commands (doctor, dashboard, reset, uninstall) resolve correctly instead of exposing a non-functional maintenance placeholder command.
• CLI/Dashboard: when gateway.bind=lan, generate localhost dashboard URLs to satisfy browser secure-context requirements while preserving non-LAN bind behavior. (#16434) Thanks @BinHPdev.
• TUI/Gateway: resolve local gateway target URL from gateway.bind mode (tailnet/lan) instead of hardcoded localhost so openclaw tui connects when gateway is non-loopback. (#16299) Thanks @cortexuvula.
• TUI: honor explicit --session <key> in openclaw tui even when session.scope is global, so named sessions no longer collapse into shared global history. (#16575) Thanks @cinqu.
• TUI: use available terminal width for session name display in searchable select lists. (#16238) Thanks @robbyczgw-cla.
• TUI: refactor searchable select list description layout and add regression coverage for ANSI-highlight width bounds.
• TUI: preserve in-flight streaming replies when a different run finalizes concurrently (avoid clearing active run or reloading history mid-stream). (#10704) Thanks @axschr73.
• TUI: keep pre-tool streamed text visible when later tool-boundary deltas temporarily omit earlier text blocks. (#6958) Thanks @KrisKind75.
• TUI: sanitize ANSI/control-heavy history text, redact binary-like lines, and split pathological long unbroken tokens before rendering to prevent startup crashes on binary attachment history. (#13007) Thanks @wilkinspoe.
• TUI: harden render-time sanitizer for narrow terminals by chunking moderately long unbroken tokens and adding fast-path sanitization guards to reduce overhead on normal text. (#5355) Thanks @tingxueren.
• TUI: render assistant body text in terminal default foreground (instead of fixed light ANSI color) so contrast remains readable on light themes such as Solarized Light. (#16750) Thanks @paymog.
• TUI/Hooks: pass explicit reset reason (new vs reset) through sessions.reset and emit internal command hooks for gateway-triggered resets so /new hook workflows fire in TUI/webchat.
• Cron: prevent cron list/cron status from silently skipping past-due recurring jobs by using maintenance recompute semantics. (#16156) Thanks @zerone0x.
• Cron: repair missing/corrupt nextRunAtMs for the updated job without globally recomputing unrelated due jobs during cron update. (#15750)
• Cron: skip missed-job replay on startup for jobs interrupted mid-run (stale runningAtMs markers), preventing restart loops for self-restarting jobs such as update tasks. (#16694) Thanks @sbmilburn.
• Discord: prefer gateway guild id when logging inbound messages so cached-miss guilds do not appear as guild=dm. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
• Discord: treat empty per-guild channels: {} config maps as no channel allowlist (not deny-all), so groupPolicy: "open" guilds without explicit channel entries continue to receive messages. (#16714) Thanks @xqliu.
• Models/CLI: guard models status string trimming paths to prevent crashes from malformed non-string config values. (#16395) Thanks @BinHPdev.
• Gateway/Subagents: preserve queued announce items and summary state on delivery errors, retry failed announce drains, and avoid dropping unsent announcements on timeout/failure. (#16729) Thanks @Clawdette-Workspace.
• Gateway/Sessions: abort active embedded runs and clear queued session work before sessions.reset, returning unavailable if the run does not stop in time. (#16576) Thanks @Grynn.
• Sessions/Agents: harden transcript path resolution for mismatched agent context by preserving explicit store roots and adding safe absolute-path fallback to the correct agent sessions directory. (#16288) Thanks @robbyczgw-cla.
• Agents: add a safety timeout around embedded session.compact() to ensure stalled compaction runs settle and release blocked session lanes. (#16331) Thanks @BinHPdev.
• Agents: keep unresolved mutating tool failures visible until the same action retry succeeds, scope mutation-error surfacing to mutating calls (including session_status model changes), and dedupe duplicate failure warnings in outbound replies. (#16131) Thanks @Swader.
• Agents/Process/Bootstrap: preserve unbounded process log offset-only pagination (default tail applies only when both offset and limit are omitted) and enforce strict bootstrapTotalMaxChars budgeting across injected bootstrap content (including markers), skipping additional injection when remaining budget is too small. (#16539) Thanks @CharlieGreenman.
• Agents/Workspace: persist bootstrap onboarding state so partially initialized workspaces recover missing BOOTSTRAP.md once, while completed onboarding keeps BOOTSTRAP deleted even if runtime files are later recreated. Thanks @gumadeiras.
• Agents/Workspace: create BOOTSTRAP.md when core workspace files are seeded in partially initialized workspaces, while keeping BOOTSTRAP one-shot after onboarding deletion. (#16457) Thanks @robbyczgw-cla.
• Agents: classify external timeout aborts during compaction the same as internal timeouts, preventing unnecessary auth-profile rotation and preserving compaction-timeout snapshot fallback behavior. (#9855) Thanks @mverrilli.
• Agents: treat empty-stream provider failures (request ended without sending any chunks) as timeout-class failover signals, enabling auth-profile rotation/fallback and showing a friendly timeout message instead of raw provider errors. (#10210) Thanks @zenchantlive.
• Agents: treat read tool file_path arguments as valid in tool-start diagnostics to avoid false “read tool called without path” warnings when alias parameters are used. (#16717) Thanks @Stache73.
• Ollama/Agents: avoid forcing <final> tag enforcement for Ollama models, which could suppress all output as (no output). (#16191) Thanks @Glucksberg.
• Plugins: suppress false duplicate plugin id warnings when the same extension is discovered via multiple paths (config/workspace/global vs bundled), while still warning on genuine duplicates. (#16222) Thanks @shadril238.
• Skills: watch SKILL.md only when refreshing skills snapshot to avoid file-descriptor exhaustion in large data trees. (#11325) Thanks @household-bard.
• Memory/QMD: make memory status read-only by skipping QMD boot update/embed side effects for status-only manager checks.
• Memory/QMD: keep original QMD failures when builtin fallback initialization fails (for example missing embedding API keys), instead of replacing them with fallback init errors.
• Memory/Builtin: keep memory status dirty reporting stable across invocations by deriving status-only manager dirty state from persisted index metadata instead of process-start defaults. (#10863) Thanks @BarryYangi.
• Memory/QMD: cap QMD command output buffering to prevent memory exhaustion from pathological qmd command output.
• Memory/QMD: parse qmd scope keys once per request to avoid repeated parsing in scope checks.
• Memory/QMD: query QMD index using exact docid matches before falling back to prefix lookup for better recall correctness and index efficiency.
• Memory/QMD: pass result limits to search/vsearch commands so QMD can cap results earlier.
• Memory/QMD: avoid reading full markdown files when a from/lines window is requested in QMD reads.
• Memory/QMD: skip rewriting unchanged session export markdown files during sync to reduce disk churn.
• Memory/QMD: make QMD result JSON parsing resilient to noisy command output by extracting the first JSON array from noisy stdout.
• Memory/QMD: treat prefixed no results found marker output as an empty result set in qmd JSON parsing. (#11302) Thanks @blazerui.
• Memory/QMD: avoid multi-collection query ranking corruption by running one qmd query -c <collection> per managed collection and merging by best score (also used for search/vsearch fallback-to-query). (#16740) Thanks @volarian-vai.
• Memory/QMD: detect null-byte ENOTDIR update failures, rebuild managed collections once, and retry update to self-heal corrupted collection metadata. (#12919) Thanks @jorgejhms.
• Memory/QMD/Security: add rawKeyPrefix support for QMD scope rules and preserve legacy keyPrefix: "agent:..." matching, preventing scoped deny bypass when operators match agent-prefixed session keys.
• Memory/Builtin: narrow memory watcher targets to markdown globs and ignore dependency/venv directories to reduce file-descriptor pressure during memory sync startup. (#11721) Thanks @rex05ai.
• Security/Memory-LanceDB: treat recalled memories as untrusted context (escape injected memory text + explicit non-instruction framing), skip likely prompt-injection payloads during auto-capture, and restrict auto-capture to user messages to reduce memory-poisoning risk. (#12524) Thanks @davidschmid24.
• Security/Memory-LanceDB: require explicit autoCapture: true opt-in (default is now disabled) to prevent automatic PII capture unless operators intentionally enable it. (#12552) Thanks @fr33d3m0n.
• Diagnostics/Memory: prune stale diagnostic session state entries and cap tracked session states to prevent unbounded in-memory growth on long-running gateways. (#5136) Thanks @coygeek and @vignesh07.
• Gateway/Memory: clean up agentRunSeq tracking on run completion/abort and enforce maintenance-time cap pruning to prevent unbounded sequence-map growth over long uptimes. (#6036) Thanks @coygeek and @vignesh07.
• Auto-reply/Memory: bound ABORT_MEMORY growth by evicting oldest entries and deleting reset (false) flags so abort state tracking cannot grow unbounded over long uptimes. (#6629) Thanks @coygeek and @vignesh07.
• Slack/Memory: bound thread-starter cache growth with TTL + max-size pruning to prevent long-running Slack gateways from accumulating unbounded thread cache state. (#5258) Thanks @coygeek and @vignesh07.
• Outbound/Memory: bound directory cache growth with max-size eviction and proactive TTL pruning to prevent long-running gateways from accumulating unbounded directory entries. (#5140) Thanks @coygeek and @vignesh07.
• Skills/Memory: remove disconnected nodes from remote-skills cache to prevent stale node metadata from accumulating over long uptimes. (#6760) Thanks @coygeek.
• Sandbox/Tools: make sandbox file tools bind-mount aware (including absolute container paths) and enforce read-only bind semantics for writes. (#16379) Thanks @tasaankaeris.
• Media/Security: allow local media reads from OpenClaw state workspace/ and sandboxes/ roots by default so generated workspace media can be delivered without unsafe global path bypasses. (#15541) Thanks @lanceji.
• Media/Security: harden local media allowlist bypasses by requiring an explicit readFile override when callers mark paths as validated, and reject filesystem-root localRoots entries. (#16739)
• Discord/Security: harden voice message media loading (SSRF + allowed-local-root checks) so tool-supplied paths/URLs cannot be used to probe internal URLs or read arbitrary local files.
• Security/BlueBubbles: require explicit mediaLocalRoots allowlists for local outbound media path reads to prevent local file disclosure. (#16322) Thanks @mbelinky.
• Security/BlueBubbles: reject ambiguous shared-path webhook routing when multiple webhook targets match the same guid/password.
• Security/BlueBubbles: harden BlueBubbles webhook auth behind reverse proxies by only accepting passwordless webhooks for direct localhost loopback requests (forwarded/proxied requests now require a password). Thanks @simecek.
• Feishu/Security: harden media URL fetching against SSRF and local file disclosure. (#16285) Thanks @mbelinky.
• Security/Zalo: reject ambiguous shared-path webhook routing when multiple webhook targets match the same secret.
• Security/Nostr: require loopback source and block cross-origin profile mutation/import attempts. Thanks @vincentkoc.
• Security/Signal: harden signal-cli archive extraction during install to prevent path traversal outside the install root.
• Security/Hooks: restrict hook transform modules to ~/.openclaw/hooks/transforms (prevents path traversal/escape module loads via config). Config note: hooks.transformsDir must now be within that directory. Thanks @akhmittra.
• Security/Hooks: ignore hook package manifest entries that point outside the package directory (prevents out-of-tree handler loads during hook discovery).
• Security/Archive: enforce archive extraction entry/size limits to prevent resource exhaustion from high-expansion ZIP/TAR archives. Thanks @vincentkoc.
• Security/Media: reject oversized base64-backed input media before decoding to avoid large allocations. Thanks @vincentkoc.
• Security/Media: stream and bound URL-backed input media fetches to prevent memory exhaustion from oversized responses. Thanks @vincentkoc.
• Security/Skills: harden archive extraction for download-installed skills to prevent path traversal outside the target directory. Thanks @markmusson.
• Security/Slack: compute command authorization for DM slash commands even when dmPolicy=open, preventing unauthorized users from running privileged commands via DM. Thanks @christos-eth.
• Security/iMessage: keep DM pairing-store identities out of group allowlist authorization (prevents cross-context command authorization). Thanks @vincentkoc.
• Security/Google Chat: deprecate users/<email> allowlists (treat users/... as immutable user id only); keep raw email allowlists for usability. Thanks @vincentkoc.
• Security/Google Chat: reject ambiguous shared-path webhook routing when multiple webhook targets verify successfully (prevents cross-account policy-context misrouting). Thanks @vincentkoc.
• Telegram/Security: require numeric Telegram sender IDs for allowlist authorization (reject @username principals), auto-resolve @username to IDs in openclaw doctor --fix (when possible), and warn in openclaw security audit when legacy configs contain usernames. Thanks @vincentkoc.
• Telegram/Security: reject Telegram webhook startup when webhookSecret is missing or empty (prevents unauthenticated webhook request forgery). Thanks @yueyueL.
• Security/Windows: avoid shell invocation when spawning child processes to prevent cmd.exe metacharacter injection via untrusted CLI arguments (e.g. agent prompt text).
• Telegram: set webhook callback timeout handling to onTimeout: "return" (10s) so long-running update processing no longer emits webhook 500s and retry storms. (#16763) Thanks @chansearrington.
• Signal: preserve case-sensitive group: target IDs during normalization so mixed-case group IDs no longer fail with Group not found. (#16748) Thanks @repfigit.
• Feishu/Security: harden media URL fetching against SSRF and local file disclosure. (#16285) Thanks @mbelinky.
• Security/Agents: scope CLI process cleanup to owned child PIDs to avoid killing unrelated processes on shared hosts. Thanks @aether-ai-agent.
• Security/Agents: enforce workspace-root path bounds for apply_patch in non-sandbox mode to block traversal and symlink escape writes. Thanks @p80n-sec.
• Security/Agents: enforce symlink-escape checks for apply_patch delete hunks under workspaceOnly, while still allowing deleting the symlink itself. Thanks @p80n-sec.
• Security/Agents (macOS): prevent shell injection when writing Claude CLI keychain credentials. (#15924) Thanks @aether-ai-agent.
• macOS: hard-limit unkeyed openclaw://agent deep links and ignore deliver / to / channel unless a valid unattended key is provided. Thanks @Cillian-Collins.
• Scripts/Security: validate GitHub logins and avoid shell invocation in scripts/update-clawtributors.ts to prevent command injection via malicious commit records. Thanks @scanleale.
• Security: fix Chutes manual OAuth login state validation by requiring the full redirect URL (reject code-only pastes) (thanks @aether-ai-agent).
• Security/Gateway: harden tool-supplied gatewayUrl overrides by restricting them to loopback or the configured gateway.remote.url. Thanks @p80n-sec.
• Security/Gateway: block system.execApprovals.* via node.invoke (use exec.approvals.node.* instead). Thanks @christos-eth.
• Security/Gateway: reject oversized base64 chat attachments before decoding to avoid large allocations. Thanks @vincentkoc.
• Security/Gateway: stop returning raw resolved config values in skills.status requirement checks (prevents operator.read clients from reading secrets). Thanks @simecek.
• Security/Net: fix SSRF guard bypass via full-form IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals (blocks loopback/private/metadata access). Thanks @yueyueL.
• Security/Browser: harden browser control file upload + download helpers to prevent path traversal / local file disclosure. Thanks @1seal.
• Security/Browser: block cross-origin mutating requests to loopback browser control routes (CSRF hardening). Thanks @vincentkoc.
• Security/Node Host: enforce system.run rawCommand/argv consistency to prevent allowlist/approval bypass. Thanks @christos-eth.
• Security/Exec approvals: prevent safeBins allowlist bypass via shell expansion (host exec allowlist mode only; not enabled by default). Thanks @christos-eth.
• Security/Exec: harden PATH handling by disabling project-local node_modules/.bin bootstrapping by default, disallowing node-host PATH overrides, and spawning ACP servers via the current executable by default. Thanks @akhmittra.
• Security/Tlon: harden Urbit URL fetching against SSRF by blocking private/internal hosts by default (opt-in: channels.tlon.allowPrivateNetwork). Thanks @p80n-sec.
• Security/Voice Call (Telnyx): require webhook signature verification when receiving inbound events; configs without telnyx.publicKey are now rejected unless skipSignatureVerification is enabled. Thanks @p80n-sec.
• Security/Voice Call: require valid Twilio webhook signatures even when ngrok free tier loopback compatibility mode is enabled. Thanks @p80n-sec.
• Security/Discovery: stop treating Bonjour TXT records as authoritative routing (prefer resolved service endpoints) and prevent discovery from overriding stored TLS pins; autoconnect now requires a previously trusted gateway. Thanks @simecek.